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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants Dennis Wilcox and Robert May appeal from 
the judgement of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District in and for Uintah County which granted these appellants 
award in equity of $2,040.93 and denied these appellants an , 
enforcement of an agreement between the parties to this suit. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A trial on the merits was held on the 24th day of March, 
1976 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in 
and for Uintah County, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding 
and sitting without a jury. After hearing all the evidence and 
having taken the matter under advisement, the court issued a 
memorandum decision and subsequently issued finds of fact and con-
clusions of law holding the agreement ambiguous and ambivalent. 
The court further determined that although the agreement was 
not enforceable, equitable principles ind1cated that legal rela-
tionships had been created and that plaintiffs were entitled to 
damages in the amount of $4,040.93. Upon motion by defendants 
the award was reduced to $2,040.93. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants Dennis Wilcox and Robert May seek to have the 
lower court's order set aside and to have this court enter an 
-1-
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order upholding the agreement between the parties and h T Old1ng I 
defendants liable for checks drawn on insufficient funds in 
accordance with Utah Statutes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 6, 1974 plaintiffs and defendants 
'd . I entere into an agreement whereby defendants were to ou h I 
. re ase 
all of the Capital Stock in Basin Distributing Co. for $6 000 . , ,Q11: 
defendants were given the option to stay in the premises until 
they decided to move,paying $350.00 per month as rental; defen-
dants were given the option to use a truck so long as they main-
tained the lease on said truck. (See Exhibit 5) Exhibit 5 also 
indicates that defendants were to purchase all of Basin Distri-
buting inventory at the price of $4, 040. 93. (TT, 54) Plaintiffs 
admitted receiving a $ 500. 00 down payment for the Capital Stock 
I 
in Basin Distributing (TT, 53) and all parties admitted that the ' 
balance on the Capital Stock in Basin Distributing was evidencec 
by a promissory note in the amount of $5,500.00. (SeeExhibitlil, 
It was also admitted by all parties that a $ 350. 00 check for 
rent from December 6, 1974 to January 6, 1975 was paid, received, 
deposited and enured to the benefit of plaintiffs. (TT, 26) 
All parties further admit that a $1500. 00 cash down payment was 
made on the inventory. (TT, 50) 
· · check Defendant Betty Earle admitted making and giving a · 
in the amount of $1540.93 to plaintiffs to be applied towards 
inventory. (TT, 23) . f. d at some Plaintiff Dennis Wilcox test1 ie 
length that this check was presented for collection and was 
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returned unpaid. (TT, 40-42) It was further admitted by defen-
that a $1500.00 check with date of January 6, 1975 was dants 
d as Payment on inventory and was not honored by the bank receive 
h l. t was drawn. on whic (See Defendant's Answer, R. 6) Defen-
dants also admitted giving a second $350. 00 check to be applied 
as January 6, 1975 rent to plaintiffs and that it, too, was 
returned unpaid. (See Defendant's Answer, R. 6) 
There was some question as to when, in fact, defendants 
assumed control of Basin Distributing Company. The Earnest 
Money Receipt recites that defendants assumed control on Decem-
ber 6, 197 4. (See Exhibit 5) Defendant Don B. Earle testi-
fied that he did not assume control until December 16, 1974. 
(TT, 62) Mr. Earle further testified that he operated Basin 
Distributing Company from December 16, 1974 until about two 
weeks after February 3, 19 7 5. (TT, 70 and 76) 
It was brought out at trial that neither of the defen-
dants complied with the statutory licensing provisions of the 
Utah Code with respect to distributors of alcoholic beverages. 
(TT, 101-103) It was further received into evidence that defen-
dants were aware that there were laws to be complied with but 
that they were not fully apprised of their substance; that plain-
tiff O. B. Oberhansley agreed to maintain his license until such 
time as defendants could obtain theirs and, in fact, did so. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE AGREEMENT 
A..1':1BIGUOUS AND AMBIVALENT AND IN DECLINING TO 
ENFORCE SAID AGREEMENT. 
-3-
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1 
The lower court, without stating why, indicates in 
its memorandum opinion that the agreement between the par-
ties is ambiguous and ambivalent and that all collateral 
agreements are ambivalent, ambiguous and loose. Apparent-
ly the lower court decided that since there was ambiguity the 
contr,act was not enforceable. The fact that some ambiguity 
exists does not in and of itself render a contract unenforce-
able, and it is appellants' contention that the required amount 
of ambiguity was not present in this case. 
The general rule is well stated in 17 Am Jur 2d, 
Contracts, §76, wherein it states: 
The degree of definiteness and certainty 
required has been variously stated. It 
is said that it must be possible to ascer-
tain the full meaining with reasonable 
certainty, or that the obligations of the 
parties must be reasonably certain .... The 
agreement must be certain and unequivocal 
in its essential terms either within it-
self or by reference to some other agree-
ment or matter .... It has been said that an 
agreement to be binding must be sufficient-
.!Y. definite to enable the court to deter-
mine its exact meaning and fix definitely 
the legal liability of the parties. 
Absolute certainty is not required, 
however; only reasonable certainty is neces-
sary. A contract is not subject to the ob-
jection that it is indefinite so long as 
the parties can tell when it has been perfor-
med, and it is enough if, when that time 
arrives, there is in existence some stan-
dard by which performance can be tested. 
(emphasis added) 
Applying these standards to the contract in this case, 
. d f, ni te that it becomes clear that this contract is not so in e i 
it is unenforceable. 
. pl dif-The contract provides for seve ·· 
distri · 
\ 
ferent items of sale: 1) it provides for the sale of a 
-4- J 
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I 
\ butorship for the stated price of $6, 000. 00, $500. 00 to be 
!laid on December 6, 1974 as a down payment and $500. 00 a month 
beginning January 10, 1975 until paid in full with interest 
at 7% on the unpaid balance, the monthly payments including the 
interest; 2) it provides for the sale of inventory that was to 
be counted on December 6, 19 7 4, said sale to be in an amount 
different from the $6,000.00 previously mentioned and quite 
easily determined by the court to have been $4,040.93; 3) it 
provides for a rental option at $350.00 per month should the 
buyers wish to remain in the building and further provides that 
at the expiration of 8 months the rental would increase if 
buyers were still present on the premises; 4) finally it pro-
vides that in the event buyers wish to continue the lease on 
the truck they, buyers, will pay sellers $1,000.00 and that buy-
ers will assume all obligations after December 6, 1974 and 
that any bills already paid will be refunded to sellers. 
It is not appellants'contention that the contract is corn-
pletely clear, but appellants do contend that the contract is 
sufficiently clear in its major points that reference to other 
facts will clarify the minor problems completely. For example, 
with respect to the rental clause: it was defendants' contention 
in their pleading that they did not rent the building per se. 
Appellants do not argue that point and defendants' position is 
entirely consistent with the contract. Appellants' contention 
in the lower court was not thatdefendants had rented the building 
per se, but only that in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract, defendants did,in fact,occupy the building and since they 
had occupied, defendants owed rent for the period of their occu-
oancy · The question then before the court was not whether or Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
not the contract was ambiguous but whether or not defendants \ 
had occupied the building for the period of time specified in 
appellants' complaint. If there was any question as t 
o whether 
or not defendants understood the terms of the rental clause 
a cursory look at the evidence admissible to clarify any sup-
posed ambiguity on the part of defendants would clearly indicate 
that they knew perfectly well what the clause meant. They paio 
$350.00 rent in December and tendered a bad check in the same 
amount in January. Both checks were adrni ttedly for rent. From 
the evidence, therefore, there can be no question that defendants 
understood what the clause meant. Dennis Wilcox testified that 
he knew that defendants were present and occupying the building 
until March of 1975. (TT,43) That testimony was uncontradicted 
by way of rebuttal or cross-examination even though ample oppor-
tunity was avai.la.ble to defendants to do so. 
Similarly, with respect to the truck, any ambiguities were 
cleared up quite quickly. The evidence was quite clear in ident:· I 
fying the truck. (TT, 44) The only question was whether or not 
the defendants had exercised their option to continue leasing 
the truck. No time limit is specified for the exercising of the 
option but a reasonable time would certainly be applicable. The 
evidence again indicated that for the entire time that the defen· j 
dants owned and operated the Basin Distributing Company they had 
use of the truck. (TT, 4 4) That testimony was uncontradicted 
and indicated that the defendants used the truck for approx-
Cor·' 
imately two months. With their knowledge that the truck was un •· 
a lease ,they knew that payments would have to be made either by 
themselves or by plaintiffs. 
d. d rh' 
The question is, once again' 1 · 
ambiguous. I 
defendants exercise the option and not is the contract I 
-6- ___.......... 
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Each of the other points in the contract was similarly 
explainable and the evidence tended to show that each of the 
parties knew precisely what was demanded of him by the contract. 
The fact that the contract was placed on Earnest Money Receipt 
and offer to Purchase is really of no significance. None of 
the parties argued that they did not receive a parcel of land 
and it is quite apparent from the document that it was never 
intended as a sale of land. All parties were well informed as 
to the items being sold or exchanged. Although certainly an 
awkward method of proceedure such a circumstance without more 
does not meet the criteria of ambiguity. 
Of significance in this context is the comment of the 
judge in the lower court at the end of the trial and appellants 
include this comment with all due respect and deference to the 
judge. 
THE COURT: You will submit it without argument? 
All right. I'll take this matter un-
der advisement. I would only make 
this comment, and probably should not 
make it, but it sounds to me as if 
something that could have been avoided 
just plain wasn't because of negligence, 
and perhaps a loss occurred that might 
never to have occurred. (sic) Doesn't 
appear from my observation of the evi-
dence that there's any dishonesty, any 
intent to take advantage of anybody in 
any respect. There was just plain ne-
gligence on the part of somebody that 
resulted in an unfortunate loss. Be-
cause there is no question but what 
there is a loss. 
Although it is certainly difficult to view negligence and ob-
serve a los~ that is not a reason to invalidate a valid con-
tract, rather it is grounds for apportioning responsibility 
-7-
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T 
and allocating damages if any exist based on applicable I duties 
, I 
Therefore, appellants submit to the court that this i 
con tr:.: I 
does not meet the criteria for non-enforcement because the 
contract was not ambiguous. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION AND 
PERFORMANCE TO UPHOLD THE AGREEMENT. 
The law dealing with partial performance and partial 
failure of consideration is discussed in 17 Am Jur 2d, Con-
tracts, § 39 8. The Utah Supreme Court has agreed with the state· 
1 
ment in Am Jur 2d as a general principal of law in Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Hartford Acc. and Ind. 
f£.:_, 7 Ut. 2d 366, 325 P. 2d 899 ( 1958) . At 325 P. 2d 903 the i 
general rule of law is stated to be precisely as Am Jur indicawl 
The general principle is that failure of consideration is not 
a sufficient excuse for non-performance of a promise unless the 
failure goes to the essence of the contract. 
For purposes of this point, appellants will assume that the: 
were required to give "signed agreements with the Beer companies i 
I 
to show they have exclusive right to sell in this area." Fur· 
. 11 dmit that thermore, for purposes of this point, appellants wi a 
they did not give signed agreements. In so admitting, appeiian: 
does not admit that it did t Appellant not 9erform the contrac · 
defendant', 
simply admits that it did not give signed documents to 
indicating exclusive rights. 
I 
Having admitted the above, the question then 
-8-
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L 
this such a lack of consideration that defendants are now free 
from performing their promises? The answer to that question 
must be no. 
The cited authorities indicate that the lack of conside-
ration must go to the heart of the agreement. If the lack of 
consideration is insubstantial, then the defendants cannot decline 
to perform. They may collect damages for the failur~ but they 
must perform their part of the agreement. 
In the case at bar,the allegation of the counterclaim 
was that the failure to tender to the defendants signed agree-
ments caused the business to fail. At the trial defendants 
tried to prove that this was the case. There was extensive 
treatment of this issue and the court declined to grant defen-
dants counterclaim because there was no showing that defendants 
were in any way damaged by the failure of appellants to tender 
the signed agreements. (TT, 70-80). At the termination of 
this long discourse between counsel and the court and the 
questions of evidence, the court stated: 
Well, I've got to have in order to hold for 
the defendant, it seems, on its Counterclaim 
it seems to me that I have to have some kind 
of evidence that the sellers here did not per-
form their bargain or did not deliver what they 
were required to deliver and that the failure 
or delivery resulted in damage to the defen-
dant. (TT, 80) 
Such evidence was not forthcoming,in spite of the fact 
that the court allowed defendants four weeks extension to pro-
duce witnesses to testify as to the damage caused by the plain-
tiff• 8 lack of signed agreements. The burden of oroof was not rret. 
The evidence that was produced tended to show that the defendants 
-9-
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i 
were able to continue operating the business with no d I 
amage '<ha: 
soever. The fact that Schlitz refused to sell defendants any I 
more beer was in no way linked to the actions of plaintiffs. 
Under these circumstances defendants must perform their prornis,·: 
because they have no excuse for non-performance. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING THE 
UTAH CODE WITH RESPECT TO CHECKS WRIT-
TEN ON INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. 
Under this point appellants will assume, arguendo, that 
the failure of plaintiffs to give defendants actual written do-
cuments was a failure of consideration. Even under these cir-
curnstances it was error for the court to not have enforced 
against defendants the Utah Statutes prohibiting the writing 
of checks drawn on insufficient funds and providing for the reme· 
dies prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint. 
In 2 ALR 643 there is an extensive examination of the 
severability of contracts and when a contract can be divided 
so that failure of consideration in one area of the contract 
does not destroy the entire contract. In effect, the case law 
indicates that if the contract is not simply one whole or entire 
sale whereby if one part fails all the parts fail, the contract 
is severable into its parts and failure of consideration for 
. ·th promi· 
one part does not release a defendant from complying wi - · 
ses made in other parts of the contract. The ALR discussion 
points out that one of the tests is: Can the plaintift point 
-10-
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to a separate sale pr ice for each i tern? The article goes on 
to indicate that this test does not mean that if one were selling 
twenty cars and simply divided the total sale price by twenty 
one has arrived at a separate sale price for each i tern. The test 
requires that there not be a total sale price for the entire 
"package" but that each item almost be listed separately with 
its own price or that there be almost an entire separate 
agreement for each i tern or group of i terns or that in some way 
the payment can be apportioned to each i tern. 
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is quite 
clear that the rental agreement is a completely separate item 
within the meaning of the rules stated above. The purchase of 
the inventory is also a separate item as is the leas;i.ng of the 
truck. Each item is separate and distinct. None of the items 
depend on any of the others to make them a whole contract. 
For example, the consideration for the inventory is the in-
ventory itself. Plaintiffs promised to place the inventory 
in the hands of the defendants for the defendants promise to 
pay cash for the articles. Similarly, the consideration for the 
rental agreement was the giving up of the building space by 
the plaintiff to the defendant. Finally, the consideration 
for the lease clause was the giving of the use of the truck 
to the defendants on the assumption that the defendants would 
also continue the lease payments. In each case the consideration 
for the clause is a separate and distinct act on the part of 
the plaintiff, and in each case a separate and distinct amount 
Of money or h · pure ase price is applicable to the distinct items. 
Under these circumstances the writing of checks drawn on 
insufficient funds for the payment of rent and for purchase 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Basin Distributing inventory cannot be excused bee'"" C\ol 
contracts were unenforcable. The contracts were enforceable, I 
as appellants have demonstrated under previous points of thls 
brief. Furthermore under the discussion of this point, even 
if the lack of signed agreements is a lack of considerati~ 
for a part of this contract, it is not a sufficient lack of 
consideration as to eradicate the defendants promises under 
other provisions of the contract because the contract was seve:· 
able. 
Defendants admitted in their answer that the checks on 
January 6, 1975 had been written and returned by the banks 
marked "refer to maker." The banks notified defendants of 
these two checks and defendants failed to comply with the 
statutory proceedure to cure the defect in a timely manner 
and, indeed, continue to refuse to do so. Under these circum· ' 
stances, plaintiffs should have been awarded damages for these 
checks and reasonable attorney's fees. 
SUMMARY 
The agreement which is at issue in this case was an en-
forceable agreement. Defendants did not perform under the 
agreement as they promised and plaintiffs, in being damaged 
thereby, should have received judgement as prayed for in their 
complaint. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 1977. 
-12-
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Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for Ap9ellants 
370 East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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